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ABSTRACT 
A large interdisciplinary consortium of engineers, social scientists and policy analysts have 
developed three low carbon, more electric transition pathways for the United Kingdom (UK): 
described as ‘Market Rules’ (MR), ‘Central Co-ordination’ (CC) and ‘Thousand Flowers’ (TF) 
respectively. It adapts an approach based on earlier work on understanding transitions, using a 
multi-level perspective with landscape, regime and niche levels, and its application to the 
development of ‘socio-technical scenarios’. These pathways to 2050 focus on the power sector, 
including the potential for increasing use of low carbon electricity for heating and transport, 
within the context of critical European Union developments and policies. Part 1 describes 
studies of historical energy and infrastructure transitions were described that help the 
understanding of the dynamics and timing of past transitions. The role of large-scale and small-
scale ‘actors’ in the electricity sector and the methods used to develop the pathways were then 
described. In Part 2, associated technologies are evaluated in order to determine the choices 
that need to be made by UK energy policymakers and stakeholders. Finally, all three pathways 
have been appraised in terms of their environmental performance using complementary life-
cycle assessment and footprinting methods. Lessons can clearly be drawn for other 
industrialised nations attempting to decarbonise their electricity generation systems, although 
local circumstances will determine the country- and region-specific options. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Electricity generation presently contributes approximately 30% of United Kingdom (UK) 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (Hammond, 2000; POST, 2007) the principal ‘greenhouse gas’ 
(GHG) having an atmospheric residence time of about 100 years (Hammond, 2000, IPCC, 
2013). This share mainly arises from the use of fossil fuelled (coal and natural gas) power 
stations. Changes in atmospheric concentrations of GHGs affect the energy balance of the 
global climate system. Human activities have led to quite dramatic increases since 1950 in the 
‘basket’ of GHGs incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol; concentrations  have  risen  from  330 
ppm in 1975 (IPCC, 2013) to about 408 ppm in 2018 (WMO, 2019). The recent (2013) 
scientific assessment by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) asserts that 
it is ‘extremely likely’ that humans are the dominant influence on the observed global warming 
since the mid-20th Century (IPCC, 2013). The British Government therefore introduced a bold, 
legally binding target of reducing the nation’s CO2 emissions overall by 80% by 2050 in 
comparison to a 1990 baseline (Hammond and Pearson, 2013) in their 2008 Climate Change 
Act. Achieving this carbon reduction target will require a challenging transition in Britain’s 
systems for producing, delivering and using energy that is not only low carbon, but also secure 
and affordable; thus resolving the so-called energy policy ‘trilemma’ (Hammond & Pearson, 
2017). The 2015 Paris Agreement following the COP21 meeting in that city aims to keep 
temperatures “well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the 
temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels” (Ares & Hirst, 2015). The 2°C figure 
is broadly consistent with the 2050 UK CO2 emissions target. However, bottom-up pledges 
received by countries prior to the Paris Conference [the so-called ‘Intended Nationally 
Determined Contributions’ (INDCs)] for national GHG mitigation efforts are expected by 
analysts of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (Ares 
& Hirst, 2015) to result in a warming of around 2.7oC. So the world still faces a significant 
challenge of reducing GHG emissions further in order to bring global warming into line with 
the aspirations in the Paris Agreement. Indeed, the IPCC in their recent ‘special report’ on the 
implications of keeping temperatures down to 1.5°C (IPCC, 2019) argued that humanity has 
just 12 years to respond to the climate change challenge (i.e., by about 2030 rather than 2050 
presently incorporated in international agreements), if it wishes to keep global warming to 
1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Thus, it needs to instigate appropriate actions in the very 
near future. The British Climate Change Act was subsequently amended by the UK 
Government in June 2019 in order to target a reduction of all GHG emissions to net zero by 
2050. 
The history of electricity generation since the time of Edison has been based around the 
concept of employing large, centralised power stations (Hughes, 1983; Buchanan, 1994; 
Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Consequently, some 62% of electricity within Britain in 
2018, the most recent full year data available at the time of writing in the annual Digest of 
United Kingdom Energy Statistics [DUKES] (BEIS, 2019), is still generated by large 
thermal power plants [from coal (5%), natural gas (39%), and nuclear power (18%)]. These 
are connected to a high-voltage transmission grid, and is then distributed to end-users via 
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regional low-voltage distribution networks (Hammond, 2000; POST, 2007). This 
centralised model has delivered economies of scale and reliability (Hammond, 2000), but 
there are significant drawbacks. The UK Electricity Supply Industry (ESI), for example, 
currently has a heavy reliance on primary fuels, particularly coal and natural gas (BEIS, 
2019). Much of the electricity grid was constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. It is therefore 
heavily reinforced in former coal-mining areas, and is nearing the end of its design life 
(Hammond, 2000; POST, 2007; Hammond and Pearson, 2013). Power flow is restricted 
from Scotland to England (2.2GWe), and via the interconnectors (in the form of high-
voltage undersea cables) to France, Northern Ireland and the Netherlands (Hammond, 
2000; Hammond and Pearson, 2013). The grid will require not only renewal, but also 
reconfiguration in order to accommodate a greater proportion of distributed generation. 
 
1.2     The Issues Considered 
A large interdisciplinary consortium of engineers, social scientists and policy analysts have 
developed three low carbon transition pathways for a more electric future in the UK out to 
2050: termed ‘Market Rules’ (MR), ‘Central Co-ordination’ (CC) and ‘Thousand Flowers’ 
(TF) respectively. This large consortium of nine university partners was originally funded via 
the strategic partnership between e.on UK (the electricity generator) and the UK Engineering 
and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) to study the role of electricity within the 
context of ‘Transition Pathways to a Low Carbon Economy’ (2008-2012), and then renewed 
with funding solely from the EPSRC under the title ‘Realising Transition Pathways: Whole 
Systems Analysis for a UK More Electric Low Carbon Energy Future’ (RTP) (2012-2016).] 
The present research examined the most recent version 2.1 (v2.1) of the pathway narratives 
(Foxon et al., 2010; Hammond and Pearson, 2017; Chilvers et al., 2017): driven by the market, 
central government intervention, and civil society (e.g., local communities and non-
governmental organisations [NGOs]) initiatives. This emphasis on ‘governance’ as a prime 
mover of market development is a novel feature in terms of energy futures research in Britain 
(Foxon et al., 2010; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017). This transition 
pathways research has focused on the choices and actions needed to get there from here, and 
on the analysis of the pathways’ technical, socio-economic and environmental implications. It 
built on an approach based on earlier work on understanding transitions, which is fully 
described in a companion paper (Part 1). The current ‘socio-technical scenarios’ or transition 
pathways focus on power generation, including the potential for increasing use of low-carbon 
electricity for heating and transport. The extent to which choices need to be made by UK energy 
policymakers and stakeholders between the large-scale and small-scale actors, pathways and 
associated technologies are discussed.  
The present research programme sought to understand and contribute to potential future 
transitions of UK energy systems and to enhance policy thinking and decision-making. In Part 
1 studies of historical energy and infrastructure transitions - which inform how the broad, long-
term sweep of change that arises out of interactions between actors or actor networks, 
institutions and infrastructures – are used to aid the understanding the dynamics and timing of 
transitions (Chilvers et al., 2017; Pearson, 2018). The multi-level perspective (MLP) – 
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encompassing, as noted there, macro-landscape pressures, socio-technical regimes and niche 
innovations - has been used as the basis for developing the socio-technical scenarios [as 
depicted in Part 1 Fig. 2 (Foxon et al., 2010)]. These can be employed to explore the potential 
future development of socio-technical systems through interactions between ongoing processes 
at the three levels (Foxon, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2017).  
In the current paper (Part 2) horizon scanning and energy technology assessments (ETAs) of 
the energy technologies that influence the three UK transition pathways are employed to 
provide an understanding the future interplay of the energy policy trilemma, i.e., achieving 
deep GHG emission cuts, whilst maintaining a secure and affordable energy system, and 
addressing how resulting tensions might be resolved. Indicative ETAs are used to identify the 
components of a balance sheet of technological credits and debits to evaluate their societal 
impacts, and to determine whether they will enhance Britain's move towards a low carbon 
dioxide (‘low-carbon’) future in 2050 and beyond. Here (Part 2) all three pathways (MR, CC 
and TF) have also been evaluated in terms of their environmental performance using 
complementary life cycle assessment (LCA) and footprinting methods. The energy analysis 
and environmental LCAs reported by Hammond et al. (2013) and Hammond and O’Grady 
(2014; 2017a; 2017b), evaluated v1.1 and v2.1 of the pathways respectively). Environmental 
footprint analysis (EFA) has been employed to estimate the environmental and resource 
burdens associated with UK power generation based on historic data and the three transition 
pathways (Hammond et al., 2019). 
 
2.   Horizon Scanning and Technology Assessment 
2.1  Scanning the Energy Technology Horizon 
Developments are ongoing at the niche level (see again Part 1 Fig. 2) through the formation of 
technology-specific innovation systems around a number of different technological 
alternatives. Technological discoveries may encompass one or more technological/ market 
niches (Markard and Truffer, 2008). Alternatives include centralised options on a large-scale, 
such as offshore wind, wave and tidal power, tidal barrages, biomass co-firing, new nuclear 
power, and CCS. In contrast, as noted, there is presently a growth in interest in innovative 
decentralised options, including CHP (using gas-powered fuel cells or Stirling Engines), micro-
wind turbines, solar photovoltaic arrays, solar thermal heating, and air-sourced and ground-
source heat pumps, and local energy crops. A key task for the development of the UK transition 
pathways is the elucidation of potential ‘virtuous cycles’ between the different processes or 
functions which could occur within each of these energy innovation systems. They may be seen 
as competing for resources and recognition against each other within the centralised or 
decentralised paradigm, at the same time as these two archetypes compete against each other. 
Obviously, complementarities may also exist between different the technological alternatives, 
both within and between paradigms.  
Technological choices in the UK power sector are likely to vary significantly out to 2050 
(Chilvers et al., 2017). For example, over the last few years the outlook for both coal-fired 
power stations with CCS and nuclear power has changed dramatically. The UK Government 
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indicated (in November 2015) their wish to phase out unabated coal-fired power stations by 
2025, and gave new gas-fired power stations priority. Likewise, the prospects of new nuclear 
build was hit by both concerns following the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
disaster in Japan and a reassessment of the economics of nuclear power by some of the big 
players, such as the investment decision by the French utility eDF Energy in regard to the 
construction of the Hinkley Point C nuclear power plant (in rural Somerset, in South West 
England). Nevertheless, in 2013, the UK Government gave the go-ahead for a consortium of 
France’s state-owned eDF Energy and Chinese investors (China National Nuclear Corporation 
and China General Nuclear Power Corporation) to build two new nuclear reactors of 3260 
MWe (planned) at the site with a 35-year price guarantee of £92.50 for every megawatt hour 
(MWh) generated. These short-term changes in attitudes to low carbon technologies mean that 
the technology choices implicit in each of the existing pathways need to be kept under 
continuous review (Chilvers et al., 2017).  
Horizon Scanning involves a portfolio of methods that enable energy researchers and other 
power sector stakeholders to increase their awareness of important emerging influences on the 
UK energy system and its environment. It provides a major strand in proactive risk 
management (Hammond and Waldron, 2008) and strategic thinking as the UK energy sector 
moves forward. Parker et al. (2014), for example, used a modified Delphi technique for horizon 
scanning in order to identify some thirty emergent policy issues which strongly featured science 
and technology, and which would necessitate public engagement as the policies were being 
developed. This exercise? was driven, in part, by concerns over the use of hydraulic fracturing 
(or ‘fracking’) by fossil fuel companies for UK shale gas resources in the UK. A disparate 
group of people with interests over the science and policy interface (e.g., policy makers and 
advisers, academics, and the private sector) initially elicited a long list of issues (Parker et al., 
2014). These were then refined into a shorter list that were viewed as being of top priority for 
policy makers. They included challenges related to energy and environment, such as policies 
concerning interdisciplinary whole energy systems science [incorporated by a partner in the 
RTP Consortium: Dr Jason Chilvers (Parker et al., 2014)]. A variety of alternative techniques 
are available for use in identifying emerging issues in the UK energy sector (Chilvers et al., 
2017). Arup Foresight (part of the independent firm of designers, planners, engineers, and 
consultants) have, for example, employed STEEP (Social, Technological, Economic, 
Environmental, Political) analysis to examine drivers for change in both the energy and climate 
change fields. Horizon scanning has enabled the RTP Consortium partners to take a more 
critical look at the ‘mega trends’ and uncertainties (both in the UK and internationally) implicit 
in our three transition pathways devised via stakeholder engagement, along with the associated 
technologies. Similar activities have been undertaken by the Energy Research Partnership 
(ERP) to evaluate recent changes to the energy market broadly, such as the price of oil, which 
have impacted on alternative scenarios devised by their partner, the UK Energy Research 
Centre (UKERC). 
 
2.2   ‘Whole Systems’ Evaluation of Energy Technologies and Systems 
2.2.1  Methods and Applications 
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The RTP Consortium have used a similar approach to STEEP, in conjunction with more formal 
methods of Technology Assessment (see, for example, Vig.and Paschen, 2000; Tran and Daim, 
2008), to evaluate a number of the main disruptive energy technologies. These studies have 
sought to identify the components of a balance sheet of technological credits and debits in 
order to evaluate their societal impacts, and to determine whether they are compatible with 
Britain's move towards a low carbon future in 2050 and beyond. Indicative energy technology 
assessments (ETAs) have therefore been carried out for a variety of energy technologies, e.g., 
UK shale gas extraction (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014), carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
(Hammond, 2013; Hammond and Spargo, 2014), advanced rechargeable batteries (Hammond 
and Hazeldine, 2015), Rare Earth Elements (REE) as a constraint on clean energy  technologies 
(Hammond and Mitchell, 2014), nuclear power plants (Hammond, 2011), and tidal power 
barrages (Hammond et al., 2018). These ETAs were all indicative in the sense of being a 
simplified evaluation and illustration of the performance of state-of-the-art devices. 
Nevertheless, such assessments provide a valuable evidence base for developers, policy 
makers, and other stakeholders. Each technology was evaluated using a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods within the spirit of the STEEP approach. 
  
2.2.2  Shale Gas Extraction 
The most controversial of these studies was arguably that concerning the benefits and ‘costs’ 
of shale gas fracking in Britain (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014; Parker et al., 2014). 
Exploratory drilling in the UK is at an early stage, with great uncertainty over the scale of the 
potential shale gas resource (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014; Whitelaw et al., 2019). However, 
such activities are already meeting fierce community resistance. Like all energy technologies 
it exhibits unwanted side-effects that simply differ in their level of severity compared to other 
options. Successful extraction might contribute positively in terms of fuel security and 
independence, as well as jobs and growth (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014). Shale gas may also 
make a contribution to attaining the UK's statutory GHG emissions targets, although potentially 
harmful environmental impacts need to be satisfactorily resolved via appropriate monitoring 
and robust regulation. It is unlikely that gas bills for UK household and industrial consumers 
would fall dramatically as they have done in North America, because Britain is linked to the 
wider European gas market. Anything produced in the UK would be a ‘drop in the ocean’ 
compared to imports via either pipelines or liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers. Finally, the 
socio-economic advantages and disadvantages of shale gas fracking are not evenly distributed 
between various communities and demographic groups (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014). 
Community engagement in a genuinely participative process – where the government is 
prepared to change course in response to the evidence and public opinion - will consequently 
be critically important for the adoption of any new energy option. 
 
2.2.3 Carbon Capture & Storage 
CCS facilities coupled to fossil fuelled power plants or industrial sites provide a key climate 
change mitigation strategy that potentially permits the continued use of fossil fuel resources, 
whilst reducing the CO2 emissions. Hammond and Spargo (2014) highlight the potential design 
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routes for the capture, transport, clustering, and storage of CO2 from UK power plants. Due to 
lower operating efficiencies, the CCS plants showed a longer energy payback period and a 
lower energy gain ratio than conventional plant. The Transition Pathways team (Hammond et 
al., 2013; Hammond and O’Grady (2014) found that, when upstream effects are taken into 
account, this can reduce the capture rate to 70% (compared to the anticipated design figure of 
around 90%) over the life-cycle. There are also several technical and financial obstacles that 
need to be overcome (Hammond, 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017), including the adoption of an 
appropriate legislative framework and the need for full CCS chain risk assessments. There are 
uncertainties over the full-scale power plant CCS technical performance and costs, which may 
only become clearer when the first demonstrators are operational. The UK Government 
established a CCS Cost Reduction Task Force (Hammond, 2013) as an industry-led joint 
venture to assist with the challenge of making CCS a commercially viable operation by the 
early 2020s. The main cost reduction opportunities were seen as being (Hammond, 2013; 
Chilvers et al., 2017): (i) transport and storage scale and utilisation, (ii) improved financeability 
for the CCS chain, and finally (iii) improved engineering designs and performance. Greater 
financial incentives for carbon abatement could, in principal, be secured through a higher 
carbon price from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), although that has 
been a significant disappointment in terms of the carbon price level. The UK Government is 
currently working with industry to support the development of a cost-competitive CCS industry 
in the 2020s. Through its 2017 Clean Growth Strategy (CGS) it intends to invest £162 million 
in a clean growth innovation funding out to 2021 (Cooper and Hammond, 2018) - much of it 
earmarked for CCS - to support R&D and innovation, although only a few small-scale CO2 
capture demonstrations have so far been implemented. The Government recently stated that, 
“We are committed to the UK having the option to deploy CCUS at scale during the 2030s 
subject to the costs coming down sufficiently”, noting that this commitment “is contingent on 
industry joining us in meeting the challenge of delivery” (HM Government, 2018). 
 
2.2.4  Nuclear Power 
The lives of existing nuclear plant have typically been extended to around 40 years [e.g., 
Hunterston B was financed for 25 years with an expectation of 35 years, and subsequently 
extended by 7 years (Chilvers et al., 2017)]. Nevertheless Britain, as with other nuclear-
powered European countries, is progressively decommissioning its older nuclear power 
stations during the next decade or so. This will leave only the Sizewell B Pressurised Water 
Reactor (PWR) station in the UK, with nuclear power holding a considerably reduced share of 
electricity generation. Consequently, a new generation of nuclear power stations may need to 
be part of the power generation mix in order to decarbonise the electricity sector by around 
2030-2050 (Hammond, 2011; Chilvers et al., 2017). A number of issues affecting the use of 
nuclear electricity generation in Western Europe were considered as part of an indicative ETA 
(Hammond, 2011), including its cost, industrial strategy needs, and the public acceptability of 
nuclear power. The contribution of nuclear power stations to achieving CO2 targets aimed at 
relieving global warming has been examined in the context of alternative strategies for 
sustainable development, including renewable energy sources and energy-efficiency measures. 
Successive British governments have advocated a key role for nuclear power in the future UK 
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energy mix, alongside other low carbon technologies. They seek to encourage energy utility 
companies to invest in new nuclear build (DECC, 2011). Nuclear power is an energy 
technology with near-zero CO2 emissions that is available now on a large-scale. It could 
therefore play a useful role as part of a low carbon energy strategy. Nevertheless, energy 
efficiency measures currently displace between 2.5 and 20 times more carbon dioxide than 
would new nuclear power plant per dollar (euro or pound) invested (Keeping, 1990). Indeed 
the former UK Sustainable Development Commission (SDC, 2006) argued that a new nuclear 
programme would give out the wrong signal to both consumers and businesses. It would not 
justify public subsidy and, if implemented on a significant scale, might hold out a risk that the 
taxpayer will be have “to pick up the tab” (SDC, 2006), although this would be mitigated as all 
new build nuclear projects are required to have agreed funded decommissioning plans. In 
addition, the adoption of either short- or medium-term reactor plant technologies would 
obviously be critically dependent on public attitudes to nuclear power in Britain and elsewhere 
(Hammond, 2000; Hammond and Waldron, 2008; Hammond, 2011), particularly in regard to 
safety, waste management and nuclear proliferation. Nuclear power gives rise to ongoing 
problems with high and intermediate-level waste disposal (Hammond, 2011), although a deep 
underground repository is the preferred option. The siting of such a facility has yet to be 
resolved in the UK. These consequently remain significant barriers to a large scale-up of 
nuclear power in Britain, but the waste disposal issue will need to be resolved due to legacy 
radioactive wastes regardless of extent of any new nuclear build. However, the construction of 
the first new nuclear power in the UK for over 20 years began in 2016, following the signing 
of contracts between the UK Government, EDF and China General Nuclear (CGN) for the 
‘Hinkley Point C’ (HPC) nuclear power station, which is predicted to take 10 years to build 
(Barton et al., 2018). 
 
2.2.5  Tidal Power Barrages 
The Severn Estuary, which empties into the Bristol Channel, is seen as one of the premium 
international tidal power locations because it has the second largest tidal range in the world (15 
m). It would involve the construction of a 10 mile long barrage (dam) between Lavernock 
Point (south of Cardiff, Wales), and Brean Down on the Somerset coast, England The use of 
technology that utilises the tidal range is well-established, and typically has an estimated 
lifetime of 120 years (Barton et al., 2018; Hammond et al., 2018). Both the Cardiff-Weston 
and the smaller Shoots barrages on the River Severn have been evaluated by Hammond et al. 
(2018) using various ETA techniques to determine their net energy output, carbon footprint 
and financial investment criteria, alongside various critical technical and environmental issues. 
These tidal power schemes were assessed over their foreseen lifespan of 120 years in terms of 
its cradle-to-site, operation and maintenance requirements. The proposed Cardiff-Weston 
Barrage would yield relatively attractive figures of merit in terms of its net energy and carbon 
emissions, although its financial performance is poorer than alternative power generators. 
Comparisons were made with the much smaller, Shoots Barrage scheme that would be located 
up-river of the Severn road crossings, and which is favoured by environmental groups, because 
of its more benign ecological and environmental impacts (Hammond et al., 2018). The capital 
costs would be recouped, but only with very long pay-back periods. Thus, the UK Government 
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decided that a proposed 8.64 GW Cardiff-Weston barrage was not required to meet 2020 
renewable energy targets (Hammond et al., 2018), due to these cost considerations, as well as 
the local environmental impacts. They argued that it should not be supported by public funds, 
although the project may still be considered in the future (DECC, 2011). However, plans for a 
320 MW tidal lagoon ‘pathfinder’ power plant in Swansea Bay were supported by a 
government-commissioned review (Barton et al., 2018; Hammond et al., 2018), but it was 
ultimately rejected for public funding in 2018. The pioneering scheme is presently being 
‘rebooted’ by private sector investors, who believe they can build it without the help of 
government. 
 
2.2.6  Other Green Technologies 
The suitability of advanced rechargeable battery technologies (ARBT) for different 
applications, such as electric vehicles (EV), consumer electronics, load levelling, and stationary 
power storage, has been the subject of another ETA (Hammond and Hazeldine, 2015). These 
energy storage devices were compared to more mature Nickel-Cadmium (Ni-Cd) batteries in 
order to gain a sense of perspective regarding the performance of the ARBT. Li-ion batteries 
(LIB) currently dominate the rechargeable battery market and are likely to continue to do so in 
the short-term in view of their excellent all-round performance (Hammond and Hazeldine, 
2015), and firm grip on consumer electronics. The high charge/discharge cycle life of these 
LIBs mean that their use may grow in the electric vehicle (EV) sector, and to a lesser extent in 
load levelling, if safety concerns are overcome and costs fall significantly. However, in view 
of the competition from Lithium-ion polymer (LIP) batteries their long-term future is uncertain. 
LIP batteries exhibited attractive values of gravimetric energy density, volumetric energy 
density, and power density (Hammond and Hazeldine, 2015). Although, if safety concerns with 
LIB are overcome and costs fall significantly, there may be growth in the EV sector and to a 
lesser extent load-levelling, where LIB can exploit their relatively high cycle life.  
Rare earth batteries and magnets are key elements of hybrid vehicles and gearless wind 
turbines, and phosphors are critical in energy saving lighting. Hammond and Mitchell (2014) 
argued that rare earth elements (REE) may place a significant constraint on the development 
of some low carbon (or clean) energy technologies. These materials are not actually rare in 
terms of their abundance, but the number and location of mines are restricted due, in part, to 
economic considerations. Current REE reserves stand at about 110 million tonnes with around 
half in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), although other countries like the USA, 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) [the former Soviet Republics], and Australia hold 
substantial reserves. However, production in China dominates the market, with ~97% of the 
global total, and this will remain so until new mines are developed. The PRC has in the recent 
past limited its export of REE in order to give preference to the export of manufactured 
products. It is likely that supply constraints will become less critical in the medium to long-
term as more mines come into operation, and thus further reserves become available 
(Hammond and Mitchell, 2014). Such constraints could be eased by reducing the amount of 
material required per application, or changing the technology altogether. Lithium-ion batteries, 
for example, are already a viable replacement for nickel-metal-hydride units in hybrid vehicles. 
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LIB costs have fallen from $1,000/kWh to <$250/kWh for a battery pack in less than 8 years 
(Shojaei, 2017). REE are not currently recycled, either pre or post-use. There are processes 
available that could be utilised for this purpose (Hammond and Mitchell, 2014), although they 
don’t currently appear to be economically viable options. 
 
2.2.7  Cross-technology Comparisons of Performance Criteria 
 
An evaluation of the energy densities and spatial footprints of both conventional and renewable 
generators was undertaken by Cheng and Hammond (2017) on a life-cycle (or ‘cradle-to-gate’) 
basis. It had previously been argued in the literature that some of the renewable power 
generators take up far more land than their fossil fuelled or nuclear-powered counterparts. This 
assertion has consequentially been tested over the ‘full fuel chain’ in order to provide a valuable 
evidence base for developers, policy makers, and other stakeholders. The energy densities over 
this domain were determined using ‘process energy analysis’, whereby the energy required to 
produce electricity is evaluated taking into account both the direct energy use and the indirect 
(or ‘embodied’) energy requirements for materials and capital outputs. Here the resulting 
energy densities (GWh/km2) are presented in Fig. 1, and those for the corresponding spatial 
footprints (km2/TWh) in Fig. 2 (Cheng and Hammond, 2017). It can be seen that the nuclear 
fuel cycle (both with diffusion and centrifuge enrichment) was found to have the highest energy 
density of the technologies evaluated, with bioenergy plants having the lowest. Onshore wind 
power exhibited a relatively promising energy density; being greater than that for its offshore 
counterpart. The energy density of the latter fell below that of solar PV arrays. Thus, 
renewables were found to produce dilute electricity overall with a spatial footprint that is 
orders-of-magnitude higher than for conventional sources. Clearly, there are many other 
sustainability criteria that will determine their usefulness in the transition towards a low carbon 
future (Cheng and Hammond, 2017; Chilvers et al., 2017). 
 
3.      Environmental Appraisal of the UK Transition Pathways 
3.1  Environmental Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) 
The energy and environmental appraisal of the three transition pathways and associated power 
technologies have been evaluated on a life-cycle basis (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014; 2017a; 
2017b). This process employed a toolkit of techniques to explore and evaluate the whole 
systems consequences of the selected transition pathways, such as the (embodied and process) 
energy and carbon implications of the pathways and technology mixes, and their environmental 
burdens [as indicated by environmental life-cycle assessment (LCA)]. A comprehensive review 
of the LCA of energy systems by Hammond et al. (2015) included an overview of the historic 
development of LCA from the early 1990s, and its subsequent codification by the International 
Standards Organization (ISO). Environmental appraisal of energy systems needs to be 
conducted on a life-cycle basis, i.e., embracing the full range of extraction, production, 
distribution, and end-of-life processes or technologies (Baumann and Tillman, 2004; Curran, 
2012; Hammond et al., 2013; Hammond and O’Grady, 2014; Hammond et al., 2015). In a full 
or detailed LCA the energy and materials used and pollutants or wastes released into the 
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environment as a consequence of an activity or service are quantified over the whole life-cycle; 
typically from cradle-to-gate (Hammond et al., 2015). Such studies are often geographically 
diverse; that is, the energy and material inputs associated with the activity may be drawn from 
any continent or geo-political region of the world. They involve four main LCA stages that 
follow a logical sequence of goal definition and scoping, inventory analysis, impact 
assessment, and interpretation of the results.  
 
Fig. 1. Energy densities of selected power generators (GWh/km2).  
[Source: adapted from Cheng and Hammond, 2017.] 
 
An examination of the whole system environmental burdens of the present (v2.1) transition 
pathways was undertaken by Hammond and O’Grady (2014; 2017a; 2017b) [as an extension 
of the earlier LCA study by Hammond et al. (2013) of v1.1 of the pathways]. In the initial 
study, the GHG emissions were the sum of both upstream and operational (or ‘stack’) emissions 
(Hammond and O’Grady, 2014). The latter emissions are those directly associated with the 
combustion of fossil fuels within power stations. Thus, the whole system emissions amount to 
those related to the ‘cradle-to-gate’. The national electricity network (operated by TNOs and 
DNOs) represents the downstream boundary is known as the gate [hence, cradle-to-gate 
(Hammond et al., 2013)]. Both Hammond et al. (2013) and Hammond and O’Grady (2014) 
highlighted the significance of upstream emissions and their (technological and policy) 
implications, in contrast to the emphasis on power plant operational emissions conventionally 
presented by other analysts. These upstream environmental impacts arise from the energy 
requirements for extraction, processing/refining, transport, and fabrication, as well as methane 
leakages from coal mining activities – a major contribution – and natural gas pipelines. The 
various life-cycle stages and processes within the system boundaries of the present study are 
illustrated in Fig. 3 (Hammond et al., 2015; Barton et al., 2018). The total carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e) emissions associated with various power generators and UK electricity 
transition pathways towards a low carbon future are depicted in Fig. 4. This illustrates the GHG 
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trajectory under each of the three transition pathways in terms of per unit of electricity supplied 
out to 2050 (Hammond and O’Grady, 2017b). Examining the three pathways indicates that the 
CC pathway had significantly lower associated life-cycle emissions than its two counterparts, 
resulting in only 88g CO2e/ kWh. The MR pathway had the highest associated GHG emissions, 
emitting 121g CO2e/ kWh supplied, whereas the electricity supplied in the TF pathway had a 
GHG intensity of 107g CO2e/ kWh. Nevertheless, the TF pathway almost achieved the same 
level of decarbonisation exhibited by the CC pathway over the total system emissions 
(Hammond and O’Grady, 2017b), despite having higher associated emissions per unit of 
electricity. There is likely to be a significant fall in carbon emissions from the UK power 
generation sector of some 31-51% by 2020, 65-86% by 2030, and 78-93% in 2050 (Hammond 
and O’Grady, 2017b). The lower figures relate to the MR pathway, whilst the higher ones are 
associated with the TF pathway. Notwithstanding the emphasis on GHG emissions, some of 
the other environmental burdens may need to be monitored (see, for example, Fig. 5). 
 
Fig. 2. Spatial footprints of selected power generators (km2/TWh). [Source: adapted from Cheng and 
Hammond, 2017.] 
The transition pathways LCA study by Hammond et al. (2013) yielded estimates of pollutants 
or wastes released into the environment as a consequence of the UK ESI in terms of 18 separate 
impact indicators (together with a tentative single score, aggregate LCA measure). The lower 
the resulting score for each category the better, although they do not adequately reflect, for 
example, the impacts associated with nuclear power generation. Nuclear is low carbon, but has 
a number of other health and environmental impacts associated with the potential release of 
ionizing radiation from nuclear power stations and processing plants. These are generally not 
effectively accounted for in LCA software tools (Hammond et al., 2013), because they do not 
have an underlying basis in ecotoxicology. They studied something like 18 different impact 
categories, and consequently it is necessary to focus on key categories. Hammond and O’Grady 
(2017b) followed up this study of how the UK phase out of coal-fired power plants would 
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reduce GHG emissions associated with all three v2.1 pathways. No pathway yields zero GHG 
emissions by 2050, due to upstream emissions (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014). This suggest 
that the UK electricity sector cannot realistically be decarbonised by 2030-2040 as advocated 
by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015). Significant reductions in GHG emissions 
are exhibited (see Fig. 4 and 5), although some environmental trade-offs that need to be 
monitored. Large impacts were found in terms of categories such as Human Toxicity, 
Freshwater Eutrophication, Marine Ecotoxicity, and Natural Land Transformation (Hammond 
and O’Grady, 2017b), particularly under the MR pathway (see Fig. 5). Nevertheless, Ionising 
Radiation rises modestly from the MR to CC pathways, but is obviously much lower under the 
TF pathway.  
 
Fig. 3. System boundary diagram of the life-cycle ['cradle-to-gate'] carbon emissions assessment of 
the UK Transition Pathways. [Source: Barton et al., 2018; adapted from Hammond et al., 2015.] 
A further LCA study assessed the way in which natural gas (or methane) is used for power 
generation (Hammond and O’Grady, 2017a), and the consequences of this fuel being 
increasingly sourced from more geographically diverse sites as conventional gas reserves 
diminish. These include unconventional sources, such as shale gas (Hammond and O’Grady, 
2014) and biomethane. The GHG emissions associated with the three future gas supply mixes 
out to 2050 are presented in Fig. 6. For all three supply mixes, the associated GHG emissions 
increase significantly out to 2050 as a result of the incremental diffusion of new gas sources 
with higher upstream emissions. The central estimate GHG emission intensity of these three 
supply mixes ranged roughly from 13 to 16 gCO2e/MJ in 2050, rising from a baseline of just 
under 5 gCO2e/MJ in 2012 (Hammond and O’Grady, 2014). The high biogas dependence mix 
(Supply mix 2) had the highest associated GHG emissions, representing a 3.4 times increase in 
GHG emissions on the 2012 UK gas mix (see again Fig. 6). The high shale gas penetration 
mix (Supply mix 1), had the lowest central estimate of associated upstream emissions in 2050, 
representing a 2.7 times increase on emissions (Hammond and O’Grady, 2017a). Russian 
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pipeline gas (Supply mix 3) had the largest uncertainty range of all the sources examined. This 
range was largely due to disparity in reported methane leakage rates in that region - ranging 
from 0.9% to 3.3 % of gas transported. For liquefied natural gas (LNG) and shale gas, the 
range in fugitive methane emissions were found to be a key parameter; accounting for much of 
the uncertainty. In contrast, the range in GHG emissions associated with biomethane 
production was primarily due to the variation in the yield from available feedstocks. Since all 
these supply routes played a significant role in the future gas supply scenarios examined by 
Hammond and O’Grady (2017a), there is a considerable uncertainty range associated with all 
three gas mixes. 
 
Fig. 4. Projected ‘whole systems’ [operational (‘stack’) plus upstream] GHG emissions (kgCO2e/kWh) 
under all three UK Transition Pathways, 2008 - 2050. Environmental burdens arising from each 
generating technology. [Source: adapted from Hammond and O’Grady, 2017b.] 
 
3.2  Environmental Footprint Analysis (EFA) 
An alternative way of evaluating the environmental impacts of the three UK transition 
pathways is via carbon and environmental footprinting (Hammond et al., 2019). Environmental 
or ecological footprints have been widely used in recent years as indicators of resource 
consumption and waste absorption associated transformed on the basis of biologically 
productive land area [in global hectares (gha)] required per functional unit (such as kWhe). 
This gha is consequently a universal unit of bioproductive land area which, in the case of land 
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types (e.g., arable or cropland) with productivity higher than the average productivity of all 
bioproductive land and water on the planet, the ‘equivalence factor’ is greater than 1. They 
effectively represent a partial measure of the extent to which an activity is sustainable. In order 
to determine the footprints associated with three UK transition pathways, the overall 
environmental footprint has been disaggregated into various components (Hammond et al., 
2019): bioproductive and built land, carbon emissions, embodied energy, materials and waste, 
transport, and water consumption (see Fig. 7). Computation of the footprint necessitates a 
matrix of consumption categories and land use requirements, which is ideally suited to a 
spreadsheet implementation. This component-based approach has enabled the sustainability 
challenges to be assessed quite broadly, along with specific issues (e.g., the linkages associated 
with the so-called energy-land-water nexus). It provides a way of evaluating the implications 
of a more diverse range of environmental and resources burdens than would be possible just 
using the LCA methodology and proprietary software. 
 
 
Fig. 5. ‘Normalised’ life-cycle environmental impacts of the electricity sector for the base year (2008) 
and the three UK Transition Pathways in 2050. [Source: based on data from Hammond and O’Grady, 
2017b.] 
  
Total environmental footprint for the ‘baseline’ year of 2010 was found to be 43 million (M) 
gha (Hammond et al., 2019). The biggest contributor to these footprints per unit electricity (ef) 
is solid (so-called ‘first generation’) biofuels with 273 gha per GWh. This is due to the highest 
land-take of any of the technologies shown in Fig. 8 needed to grow energy crops, which is 
reflected in the bioproductive and built land footprint component. Carbon emissions or 
footprints are largely associated with fossil-fuelled power plants. The ef values of these plants 
were coal - 188 gha/GWh, oil - 141 gha/GWh, and natural gas - 95 gha/GWh respectively. 
Nuclear power and renewables (other than bioenergy) are near zero carbon emitters. Their ef 
values are consequently 57 gha/GWh and <25 gha/GWh respectively. The plants categorised 
as ‘Other’ represent different thermal sources that include those from various coke oven gas, 
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blast furnace gas, waste products from chemical processes, and refuse derived fuels. It gives 
rise to the second largest footprint per unit electricity at 223 gha/GWh. Nevertheless, the 
overall environmental footprint (EF) of such plants is relatively insignificant, because their 
total power capacity is small. 
 
Fig. 6. GHG emissions intensity of various potential future UK gas supply mixes (per MJ of fuel 
delivered). Error bars represent the overall uncertainty range associated with each gas. [Source: based 
on data from Hammond and O’Grady, 2017a.] 
 
Future carbon and environmental footprints were estimated for each of the three UK transition 
pathways (Foxon, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 2013; Chilvers et al., 2017; Barton et al., 
2018). Electricity demand was projected to decrease significantly from the 2010 base year 
under the TF pathway by 2050 (Hammond et al., 2019), but its total environmental footprint 
was nevertheless greater than either that under the MR or CC pathways (see Fig. 9). This is 
mainly due to the increase in the contribution of the bioproductive and built land component 
and that of the carbon footprint (rising to 10.9 and 12.5 Mgha respectively by 2050), which are 
both seen to be higher than in either of the MR and CC cases. The increase in these TF pathway 
components was mainly due to increased usage of solid biofuels for power generation 
(Hammond et al., 2019). In order to reduce the overall TF footprint it would therefore be 
necessary to adopt other renewable power technologies, like offshore wind and solar PV arrays, 
to satisfy the increase demands caused by electrification of heat and transport. The MR and CC 
pathways gave rise (see again Fig. 9) to footprints of 23 and 25 Mgha respectively, as compared 
to 43 Mgha in the 2010 base year (Hammond et al., 2019). Here the embodied energy 
component was the largest amongst the various footprint components; rising to 14 and 13 Mgha 
respectively by 2050. This was due to the large-scale use of fossil-fuelled power plants. There 
is a large reduction in carbon emissions under the MR pathway (over an 86% reduction 
compared to 2010 levels), whilst the CC pathway exhibits a slightly smaller fall (albeit nearly 
an 80% reduction). On the other hand, the TF pathway displays only 42% reduction in carbon 
emissions by 2050 (Fig. 9). Water and waste footprint components made almost negligible 
contributions under all three transition pathways (only ~1% footprint share), although this was 
recognised as probably being an artefact of the footprint methodology and assumptions adopted 
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(Hammond et al., 2019). Bioenergy and biofuel footprints and land-take (in regard to the latter, 
see Fig. 2 above) reflect relatively large environmental burdens when compared to other fuels. 
 
Fig. 7. Schematic representation of the component-based approach projections to environmental 
footprint analysis.  [Source: Hammond et al. (2019); based on the method of Simmons et al. (2000)]. 
 
4.      Concluding Remarks 
A large interdisciplinary consortium of engineers, social scientists and policy analysts have 
developed three low carbon, more electric transition pathways for the United Kingdom (UK): 
described as ‘Market Rules’ (MR), ‘Central Co-ordination’ (CC) and ‘Thousand Flowers’ (TF) 
respectively. The study builds on an approach based on earlier work on understanding 
transitions, using a multi-level perspective with landscape, regime and niche levels, and its 
application to the development of ‘socio-technical scenarios’. These pathways to 2050 focus 
on the power sector, including the potential for increasing use of low-carbon electricity for 
heating and transport. In the companion paper (Part 1) studies of historical energy and 
infrastructure transitions were reported that have helped the wider understanding of the 
dynamics and timing of past transitions, as well as the contexts and conditions that influenced 
them. Pearson (2018) recently argued that historical analyses offer insights into past energy 
transitions that are of value to non-historians who study past, current and prospective energy 
transitions and, where appropriate, to policy-makers who seek to grapple with them.  
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The extent to which choices need to be made by UK energy policymakers and stakeholders 
between the large-scale and small-scale actors, pathways and associated technologies were 
again discussed  in the Part 1 companion paper (see also Foxon, 2013; Hammond and Pearson, 
2017). The present UK transition pathways highlight the fact that significantly different 
technological pathways to a low carbon electricity system in the UK by 2050 are possible, 
although any of these pathways will be challenging to realise. They imply differing levels of 
efforts and different patterns of risks and uncertainties and different approaches to the system’s 
governance. Each exhibit diverse challenges in relation to energy efficiency and behavioural 
changes, as well as technology choices and their rate of deployment (Barton et al., 2018). The 
way in which these are addressed and resolved will depend on the governance arrangements of 
the low carbon transition, including policy measures and regulatory frameworks. So the roles 
and choices of market, government, and civil society actors are crucial to realising any of these 
pathways (Chilvers et al., 2017). 
 
Fig. 8. Environmental footprints and associated components of power generators by fuel type 
in the base year of 2010. [Source: Hammond et al., 2019.] 
In the present paper (Part 2) horizon scanning and energy technology assessments (ETAs) have 
been conducted on the energy technologies that influence the three UK transition pathways 
provides an understanding the future interplay of the energy policy trilemma, i.e., achieving 
deep GHG emission cuts, whilst maintaining a secure and affordable energy system, and 
addressing how resulting tensions might be resolved. Indicative ETAs were used to evaluate a 
number of potentially disruptive energy technologies (Chilvers et al., 2017): UK shale gas 
extraction, carbon capture and storage (CCS), nuclear power plants, and tidal power barrages, 
as well as other potentially ‘green’ energy options (ARBTs and REEs as a constraint on clean 
energy technologies). These studies have sought to identify the components of a balance sheet 
of technological credits and debits in order to evaluate their societal impacts, and to determine 
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whether they are compatible with Britain's move towards a low carbon future in 2050 and 
beyond.  
 
Fig. 9. The environmental footprint and associated components of the UK electricity sector in 
2050 under all three UK Transition Pathways. [Source: Hammond et al., 2019.] 
All three pathways have been evaluated here (in this Part 2 of the paper) in terms of their 
environmental performance using complementary life-cycle assessment and footprinting 
methods. A critical state-of-the-art review of this environmental life-cycle assessment (LCA) 
methodology has identified its current strengths and weaknesses for energy practitioners and 
policy analysts (Hammond et al., 2015). The extraction and delivery of fuel requires energy 
and creates GHG emissions. The upstream emissions associated with various power generators 
and UK electricity transition pathways have been evaluated on a whole systems basis 
(Hammond and O’Grady, 2014). There will remain further emissions upstream that are 
unaccounted for, because neither the relevant UK Government department nor their 
independent advisors [the Committee on Climate Change (CCC, 2015)] generally account for 
upstream fugitive GHG emissions beyond UK borders - even if the current UK GHG reduction 
targets are apparently met. Large impacts were also found in terms of categories such as Human 
Toxicity, Freshwater Eutrophication, Marine Ecotoxicity, and Natural Land Transformation 
(Hammond and O’Grady, 2017b), particularly under the MR pathway. Finally, the carbon 
footprints and EFs of the three UK transition pathways have also been evaluated. Here the 
overall environmental footprints were disaggregated into: built land, carbon emissions, 
embodied energy, materials and waste, transport, and water consumption. This component-
based approach has enabled the sustainability challenges to be assessed quite broadly, along 
with specific issues (e.g., the linkages associated with the so-called energy-land-water nexus). 
So-called ‘disruptive’ technological options have therefore been examined (again in Part 2 of 
the contribution) in order to provide recommendations on the framing of future energy policy 
choices that limit the environmental consequences of future electricity systems. It is argued 
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that the value of any new policy direction must be evaluated not only against medium-term 
climate change (or GHG emission) goals, but against long-term, system-wide goals over a 
wider spectrum of environmental metrics. Lessons can clearly be drawn from this transition 
pathways project for other industrialised nations attempting to decarbonise their electricity 
generation systems, although local circumstances will determine the country-and region-
specific options. 
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